continuity, i would say the administration that back in its soul-searching as to why these principles are here. do they still apply? pc the core values remain, podiatric we should approach and said yeah, these principles are nearly universal and stood the test of time that we did go back and take a hard look at the goals and principles. some other dramatic changes to the policy in my opinion that the descendents of the state department's own policy. this is just a realization that space is an international activity now. the u.s. is not the only -- it's not just u.s. and soviet union had this many places, industry, many other people that come into play we believe the state department needed a very strong will and work into that with us. one of them near and dear to my heart was an explosion at >> to a space shuttle atlantis lifted off on its 135th and direction of gps. it acknowledges that there are final flight to a told the mission at the international space station in low earth are -- gps really is a foundational piece of orbit. international infrastructure and

atlantis has a crew of four and a multipurpose logistics module that they are starting to grow containing supplies and spare this interrelationship between parts for the space station. neighboring space than those the crew is also taking the first iphone into space to help that work both industries would with experiments aboard the say the tie is very tight. gps is one of the neighbors. international space station. this is about 15 minutes. the factory will to include gps >> here is our commander, chris think that was important. ferguson in the suit up room. so one thing i will go through he's having a fit check of his is the process, how we got to helmet. the policy. this white house, you know, most >> ps our commander on this of you are familiar with the flight, and going over to pilot interagency process. but then brett summit many tax doug hurley. about the space transportation policy is having 50 people in the room with different opinions, sometimes they reflect the agencies that represent and this is his second trip into space. he completed his first flight on charm monster and referred to my wrote in the obama policy as sts 127 and has more than 176 roadkill. hours in space. people came with a lot of

things. was he figured out the president was seriously distributing a policy, the new change. as one of the most exciting >> and here is mission experiences to sit in the room specialist number one, sandy with a group of people who had a similar goal in mind, i'll came to the table but they're a game, magness. this is her third space flight. she spent more than four months save for a few folks and really in space aboard the all are together. as one of the most inviting international space station. experiences and i wish you could she flew on sts 11211 days in spend one day there and see the space and then four and a half camaraderie is the unity months after being on board the space station as the expedition invasion. of the 18 crew. the processes in the obama white house affects the processing previous white houses of the pc in the d.c. process to get this is marquez walheim, mission principals committee deputies committee on the table. specialist number two. there was a campaign discussion he's making his third in the obama campaign spaceflight and spent more than 24 days in space on sts 110 and establishment of this case, you won a 22, and he has had five space walks totaling more than need to reestablish and something like this. 36 hours, and he served

who's going to be in this phase? effectively as the branch and here they come [inaudible only set the scene for you. were sitting in this it room with agencies around the table. the sky, the sky. but are you going to talk about? space issues. you doing here right now? conversations] discussion was with the process and people are in place. i do need additional space, on amol goebel conversations top of it. i think there was never a stun castle in the system did for. we did put out a space policy in [inaudible conversations] 18 months am you know, one of my personal goals is to try to get the crew going down the elevator a space policy up before the where they will be greeted by the kennedy space center and reagan administration did and i think we beat the reagan administration by jessica members of the news media. obliques. and speaking of which, chad, this is the same elevator that's been used by the astronauts ever everyone has mentioned will stay on the shoulders of the guys who since apollo wrote the policy before us.

they will tell you my own personal -- not professional, michael skynyrd was the reagan administration policy that took all the things the carter demonstration put together. it took all these disparate part. how do we take it to the next tab? how to how to get out in front? [applause] the reagan administration policies had on my desk during the entire writing of the space [cheering] policy, dogeared, scratched her, everything else. if there's any failures in the obama policy -- [laughter] now, it's a great policy and ask folks to go back and look at obama policy and it's not one for one. there isn't a whole lot of textual similarity, baking a boc [applause] [cheering] sometimes there. yes, scary. open change. >> the actual writing of the policy to lease in a matter of five men's in a very exciting

time, painful at times. the policy rate increases [cheering] preceded by study directors on his ps2 three. president said studies areas and areas and tell me whether just be supposed he. we kind of dirty know what that means. so the study directive is finished at the end of december. senior leadership took about a month to chew on it and figure [inaudible conversations] this out already, get the crew together and start writing. so we wrote the national space policy. for those who have written national space policy is, they tell you in order to write a post in five months of tired. there's only one way the kids done and that's if everyone in the room works together. the other thing we benefited the shuttle launch control - two from its extraordinary top down hours, 31 minutes, five seconds payments. and i don't mean and counting. the flight crew is now in the rule of the orbiter access arm. micromanagement. but images of senior senior leadership undersecretaries or members of the closeout crew are vice president is very clear to what they wanted out of space. try and teach design with the

in the white coveralls and the astronauts of course are in the orange pressure suits. boss of me. the closeout crew will be someone can write a line in the interpretation begins. assisting the astronauts with their helmets and equipment as to have a senior readership of they enter the orbiter. short and that was a critical the closeout crew is scheduled to seal the access after role. i think really there'll be some 6:50 a.m., but this can be done up to an hour later if that's time for questions. i was a rundown of how he wrote the obama policy. really necessary. gushes the national space right now chris ferguson is policy. the rest is still being written. being assisted with his launch there is still alive will come and entry suits. back and figure out whether it was a success or failure. he's our sts 135 commander making his third space shuttle if it's a success i'll be back flight. he has logged more than 28 days on us, my successor at the white house come back and say why is a in space and served as the spacecraft communicator on the miserable failure. the four space shuttle missions. so i do think we try to capture he was a pilot on sts 115 and a a lot of the issues. they're a good successes, goodwins in there. i think we have a real concerted commander on sas 126. so during those missions, he effort we did a lot of press logged more than 28 days in releases and engagements to see space and also held the position we did that. so we'll see if the rest is yet as deputy chief of the astronaut

to be written on the obama policy. we find it fitting because of office. the gentleman before me. we see chris ferguson getting thank you very much. the into the seat and the folks helping him get in his seat far [applause] if you can see the number two is free and the resnick, one of the >> thank you, peter. well, not that. nearly 40 years as space policy astor restaurants you can see on in two hours and 40 minutes. the screen and he's getting i'm sure there is an enormous ready to help out the communications sector but the none of questions for the guy running the operation is panelists, but i will use the host prerogative to ask the first and that concerns number three and you can see him climbing all over. implementation of what peter mentioned another submission is if you look in the view you can the form has gone on. see chris ferguson right in front of us and to the right the policies themselves are interesting exercises in the processes and procedures put in leaning over is randy come place in order to drive them are number two car and disappeared fascinating to study, but in the is true. he's called the flight deck crew reality is the implementation of grew up in huntington beach surf these policies come the in the u.s. army he's been in translation of an idea into this role for a long time and thought and action flipping budgets and programs is where was initial sood tech in sts 86 the rubber hits the road. so i would ask the panel to back in 1987. think about for a moment to

comment on the implementation observations they had from their various administrations. how did you see this policy could implemented in where were >> a quick sayonara here. the failure points -- points of failure if there were any? and how to did happen subsequent administrations improve upon or not recognize? and invite anyone to jump in on that as these he said. steve. i'm steve brown and from the clinton administration. and syria to step out for a phone call earlier, but i stepped out and missed the entire clinton administration. but from an implementation perspective, i can talk about a good one and a bad one. gps i think clearly is a good implementation of a good policy. you know, we started that policy from scratch. there is nothing that preceded

it, although killer i didn't really take credit for reagan's kind of offering gps to the world and follow up to the loss of kal buffalo seven. but we put the policy in place and then we spent an inordinate and that's a final goodbye from amount of time and a lot of time that vice president gore's the closeout crude. we did want to catch that since adding to that and making sure that was going on. that that policy was going to but anyway, the main engines stick and get implemented. start. we added the second and third ten, nine, eight, seven, six, signals then we put in place the five -- financing package to make sure that was going to happen. >> all engines of and burning. we set in place for turning off >> two, one, zero. liftoff. selected availability and put in the final lift off of atlantis place the program with the on the shoulders of the space military that would allow that shuttle america will continue as to be turned off. a dream. we started off the international consultations on gps, starting >> houston now controlling the flight of atlantis, the space out with the european commission

and the japanese. shuttle spreads its wings one we had a joint -- that president final time for its journey into history. 24 seconds into the flight clinton and prime minister program complete at lintas now obuchi read a joint statement on head this down on the proper gps cooperation between u.s. and alignment for it eights and a japan before we left. half minutes into orbit and on so that was a very good the international space station. implementation of but i still 40 seconds into the flight of think was a very strong and the three main liquid fuel forward leaning policy. speaking of the policy process, engines traveling back to 72% of if you look at one of the top performance in the bucket goals in the first gps policy, reducing stress on the shuttle as it goes for the final time. i'm paraphrasing here, but it talks about enhancing economic engines now standing by for the throttle up call. competitiveness and productivity while protecting national security and foreign policy interests. i can tell you every word of every space policy that ever comes out to and debated in the interagency process and there were a lot of people who wanted that to be worded the other way around and enhance national security interests while >> atlantis, throttle up, no protecting economic security and product committee.

it came out the way it did as a option. reflection of the clinton at islamic the call from a transducer direction only, no industry stations focus on the economy and renewed the impact that policy was going to have on action required. jobs, growth, credit to the atlantis now 15 miles an comic technology, competitiveness and all of that. altitude already 16 miles down range from the kennedy space center, one minute into the i think that is reflected in the fact that the international astronomical federation effect flight. atlantis flexing its muscles one over is going to be sent a 60th anniversary award with a final time. atlantis traveling almost single space program but decided the greatest impact on human 2600 miles in an hour, 21 miles long range, standing by for the solid rocket booster separation lives. that is coming from the international community and that's going to be worded to the gps program. so that's a pretty important deal. i'll just use one word to talk about that implementation of stomach booster officer concerns what may be with the good policy, maybe not to be to the coup confirms good separation. guidance now converging. determined in the future. the mengin steering on a pinpoint pass to its preliminary

orbit. two minutes, 20 seconds into the [laughter] flight at lintas colin questions from the floor? 4200 miles an hour, 35 miles altitude, 50 miles downrange. [inaudible] the propulsion officer reports the orbital systems have >> and when we look towards our ignited. atlantis kicking on its afterburners for one minute, 23 fax seconds for the final communication. my question is, why not putting flight. >> atlantis, two engine. space and savored together, are you missing something at the policy level? exactly the same things apply to save her also. we know both of these things so far reached. so should we have a more consolidated approach works >> you know, if i can jump in on that, one of things we did our space policy is integrated innovation strategy. we integte

>> atlantis three engines performing perfectly. four minutes, 20 seconds into

the flight. atlanta struggling 5500 miles an hour, 62 miles out to almost 200 miles downrange. four minutes of our flight remaining. atlantis speeding the street towards with of the international space station sunday morning. atlantis press ap yo. >> that call indicating we can meet minimal orbital targets in the event of an engine failure

all three continue to function normally. atlantis will begin its role to a heads up position shortly. five and a half minutes into the flight, atlanta struggling 7700 miles, 315 miles down range stomach atlantis, single engine three. >> the guidance officer confirms the computers are commanding the main engines to swivel. >> [inaudible] >> we have rolled to a heads up position providing better communication for the tracking of the data satellite system as atlantis heads up hill.

six minutes, 20 seconds into the flight. >> that call indicates we can make our normal orbital cost targets in the event of an engine failure of three all continue to function. estimate. >> [inaudible] >> at call indicating we will be in good shape for the orientation of atlantis for the tank photography following the cut off now seven minutes into the flight. one minute and 20 seconds until the main engine cutoff traveling 12,000 miles an hour.

the main engines will be throttling down once again to limit the stress on the measures to that of three times the effect of gravity. atlantis currently traveling at more than 4 miles a second one minute of power flight remaining for the atlantis. three good main engines, three good oxen recover units, three good fuel cells approaching the eight minute mark into the flight. atlantis now traveling more than 15,000 miles per hour eight minutes and 15 seconds standing by for the main engine cutoff

followed a few seconds later by the separation of the external fuel tank. booster officer confirms main engine cutoff for the last time the main engines have fallen silent as of 4% of the final chapter of its story to 30 year adventure. now standing by for the external tank separation atlantis off the tank and chris ferguson will be maneuvering it now into an orientation to enable them to capture digital stultz imagery as it drifts away. >> it's not required. the preliminary 37 minutes.

representatives from every presidential at administration from president carter to president obama taught at the core principles of the space program shared by each administration and what drove their decisions on space policy. this is about three hours brough. [inaudible conversations]

>> good morning everyone. my name is david. the executive director of the space enterprise council. welcome to the form of focusing on the policy from the carter administration all the way to the obama administration we offered the national space policy. this is the first of its kind. this even and has not been done before and it's good timing because this may be one of the last defense c-span does because we all know the end of the world is tomorrow. a little bit of the space enterprise council, we advocate for the advancement of the space commerce in the context of white space is important to economic and national security. why is that important right now with the budget environment that

we have come space budgets are under attack, and we believe space is so integral and important to the nation this has to be our message, and we bring that message out not only to the inside the beltway crowd but also outside the beltway crowd as well as the global audience. so, it's my pleasure to introduce my co-host for today the president of the george marshall institute, the institute is one of the leading players in washington, d.c. focusing on space, security issues and space exploration issues. so jeff, i want to have the microphone over to you. >> thank you, david, and to the space enterprise counsel for graciously hosting this event today and i extend my thanks and

appreciation to the panelists for giving us their time is money to come and share their experience and expertise, their anecdotes and observations about the emergence and the development of space policy through the years. david said this evening it is as we think the first of its kind and certainly rare and unique to have this many authors in this reservoir of knowledge about space policy share with us today. as david mentioned it's increasingly important to the national security and it's important to our economic prosperity as well and that underlies a number of programs that the marshall the institute and the space council have been the next few years. to illustrate to the common man to the general public the importance of space for our military progress and economic security. whether it is the review as the current national space policy and implementation of the space policy is whether it is an assessment of the health of the industrial base that provides the tools and the means by which

we access and operate their or whether it's our focus on the commercial exploitation and exploration of space. all of those contemporary policy issues are influenced by a history that we are going to talk about today. if you examine space policy over the long run and the marshall institute has been one of the players trying to do that, if you examine that history you find continuity. certain core principles that were established as far back as the eisenhower administration and the dawn of the space age continue to resonate over the years and are present in each of this these policies we will talk about today, but there are also important issues that it added in certain areas of the discontinuity that we will certainly talk about today. in terms of the structure of the event, as i said, we have representatives of each administration from carter to obama and we will introduce each of them separately and they will come up and share their

observations and other assessments of what the space policy and other administration city and with its unique qualities or features were and how it differed from the previous administration and influenced current space policy or space issues through the years, so it's my pleasure to introduce our to morrissey representing the carter administration. of course the carter at administration is in power in a unique period in the united states. you have the iranian revolution which certainly influences the decision making. you have the soviet invasion of afghanistan which read mights the cold war period and makes the importance of the national security as ever more important for the american public. you've got economic issues at home that certainly dhaka people's perceptions of the administration as well as the ability of the government to finance the things it would like to do. all of those things and many more influence various policies of the carter administration so

it's my pleasure to ask art morrissey to the podium. he served in the of science and technology during the carter administration when he developed decision memoranda for the president on many national security issues including space policy and export controls. art? >> thank you. it's interesting to be here. thank you for the introduction to the prison the carter of fenestration space policy in the evolution of the space policy making. i want to thank the stand enterprise institute and marshall institute of the council on the institute for sponsoring this he said. as i look over the audience, it's interesting to see a multi generation of people that i've worked with over the years and of course distance in the marketplace. it's interesting to see, i know it's been described in the

outset the space policy generation has been an evolutionary process. the carter administration was the first to encompass the three sectors under its umbrella of space policy, social, space and intelligence, and the carter administration clearly built on the investments of the decision and investments that were made in the previous administrations. it would be remiss actually not to cite some of the more notable examples. in the eisenhower administration, several lasting policy directives were taken with space which of course and the treaty that was subsequently agreed to submit of legislation on nasa and it actually separated the reconnaissance activities from the air force and put it under a civilian

organization. the kennedy administration of course is the most remembered by its decision to go to the moon and the enthusiasm to achieve that objective to the also consolidated intelligence and organization activities and removed them from public scrutiny and actually placed them in the then classified organization called the national reconnaissance office to read it also endorsed the principle freedom of space and out of space was free and open to all come in as some are mentioned approved during the kennedy years was the creation of a public federally funded corporation commercial communications satellite, and we have a speaker that will be subsequently working for the organization today. the nixon administration

approved and funded the shovel and it's an enduring the program and it's still operational now 30 years after its initial operational flight. the carter ever fenestration highlights some of the things that influenced the policy consideration at the time when he arrived in 1977 there was the deployment of 17.5% which is high. federal budgets were constrained , and the cold war was still ongoing and competition in space was central for that equation. the russians were the only other national recognized space power have that time. the national technical means and satellites were pursued under the umbrella of intelligence programs supporting the verification and tactical intelligence was just the beginning of supporting the

systems capable of supporting the war fighter which is currently used to read the defense intelligence kiddo these were becoming more and more recognized as valuable contributions in the arena that we played. the space shuttle was in development and experiencing significant cost growth that continued through the carter administration. too early policy decisions taken in the carter administration to shape the subsequent national policy review board decisions on the shuttle and the decision to pursue a bilateral discussion with the soviet union at a time who put some arms limitations of space. ..

in 1978, and a lot of the material as those of you who were who're probably schooled in space policy redacted, but the fundamental aspect of the three policies were reflected in the national space policy in 37. 42 was the civil and further national policy and the civil operation was captured in ta54.

the national space policy directive established policies that would conduct the activities of space, reaffirm any of the previous administration's initiatives that. >> directives and added others, and some of the unclassified highlights included the rejection of claim of sovereignty which of course you have heard before about the space systems as a rite of passage without interference, purposeful interference with space systems would be considered an infringement on solvent rights and the united states would pursue activities in space to support the right of national defense. the u.s. was pursuing space activities and all of the application arena, civil space science to maintain u.s. leadership in space which was of course an underpinning of the space policy at that juncture. the united states would conduct

cooperative space activities to benefit the united states and encourage congressional explication of space capabilities. spelling out the space shuttle, nasa would be in cooperation in the development with nasa and launch priority would be given to defense and intelligence missions. the shuttle as i indicated would be the primary access to space but the u.s. -- he del the backups for short access that you'll you will be hearing more about subsequently as the policy of those. and close -- he tennis sectors which is one of the objectives of the space policy review was encouraged. policy organizations were asked to comment on that. it was as i said the first time that all of the space policy players or development organizations, nasa, noaa, defense department and the

intelligence community participated but in addition state jcs interior agriculture and energy were also included in the participation. it was interesting the latter two are three interior agriculture and energy were the first experienced an space policy and it was interesting to see their participation and their contributions made. the structure included all of the players with many opinions and it is interesting to note, it was surprisingly cooperative in that period. one would have thought it would have been argumentative, jumbled competition and four priorities institutional but in reality it turned out to be surprisingly successful. all departments and agencies were very vocal and omb of course from the white house concluded that discussion. in the final analysis, the president, president carter, was very involved in actually made

the ultimate decisions for the direction of the national space policy. in the remaining time i like to briefly highlight some of the civil and operation policy tenants as they have continued and will be flushed out in subsequent policy discussions as we go through the morning. there was emphasis on applications to bring important benefits to the understanding of earth resources, climate, weather, pollution and agriculture and of course you will hear again and again in other discussions as we go through the morning. an emphasis on science and to remain vital in his space technology-based. increase benefits to increase efficiencies across the various sectors and assurance that the u.s. leadership would be continued with the necessary resources for races of later decisions to develop programs.

the private sector as i also cited earlier was really encouraged to participate and become -- the administration was advocating more roles and activity by the private sector and even at that juncture. and of course to foster communications between corporations and between nations. at the time, and was decided it was not feasible or necessary to commit to a high visible, high space engineering comparable to apollo. that was wasn't a shorthand for the space station that would come in subsequent years. the government were all, to highlight two points and land programs. noah was to manage responsibility for civil -- and again there was encouragement at that juncture to press

marginalization. that discussion, and i wouldn't call it battle but that discussion and pursuit continues. the weather programs and commerce would coordinates the continual dual orbiting polar satellites and that is combined in this juncture but steps delayed for future joint development afford it. in science, space science and exploration the goals were to maintain u.s. leadership in space and planetary exploration, pursue a vigorous program in planetary exploration, continue recognizance from the outer planets and utilize the space telescope to usher in a new era of astronomy. we are asked to comment on views of accomplishments. actually, there were several restricted initiatives and program activities that occurred and i cannot devolve them but

they have been enduring insignificant. i think sustaining the shuttle program, clearly the shuttle has had a significant contribution to manned operations in space. the hubble telescope and land select or grams that i think the decision to continue them and try to make them operational and of course hubble was started in the previous administration but the benefits have been amazing and remarkable through -- to the contribution of space. the opportunities lost. i view that the inability to negotiate an arms control agreements with the russians was an opportunity lost. with the invasion of afghanistan and the soviet union later innate administration the administration decided to withdraw from negotiations. since that time that has not been a serious entertainment of any arms limitations and space since that period of time. thank you.

[applause] see a couple of those. we are going to do the q&a session at the very end of this program, so save your questions until the very end of the program and when the q&a session arrives, because we are saving this -- taping this for c-span, please make sure you state your name and your organization or affiliation. thank you. so next we have the reagan administration. the reagan administration was marked by the star wars program, arms control talks in the beginning of the space shuttle program and unfortunately the space shuttle challenger disaster. there were a few other events occurring as well, the bombing in beirut, the american embassy in beirut but a very lively area

and to discuss the reagan administration we had mr. gil rye. he was also the executive secretary to the senior interagency group for space which oversaw the military, civil and commercial sectors of the u.s. space iran. it is indeed my honor to introduce mr. gil rye. >> well good morning. i am reminded of an introduction a friend of mine gave to me recently. theory gil rye. he used to be somebody. i felt like i was somebody back in the golden years of the reagan administration when we came into office under a president who was considered to

be a true leader and it was a very stimulating and exhilarating experience for me and i am sure my fellow panelists would agree that period in the white house was one to remember and maybe a highlight of their career. and 81, tall and handsome cowboy from california moved into the white house. he came in on a campaign, a successful campaign, to demonstrate u.s. leadership in the world, and to bring on a new age for setting the stage for many of the programs that he wanted to set forth. it is a fitting time really today where we are a couple couple of months away from the last shuttle flight to travel back in time to when the shuttle

began, at least when the first operation of the shuttle landed on july 4 at 1982 at edwards air force base. president reagan was there. he was there to announce this national space policy which was really his first statement of where he stood on the space or graham in general and where he wanted the country to go. this was a product of almost a yearlong at two goody two collate all of the various inputs from all of the agencies, and to bring those together in a coherent way they carried on from previous administrations and set the course for the future. i had arrived at the white house about two months earlier and had been there only a week when bill clinton national security by

surprise and to meet with the president for the first time. i sat there in awe. the national security adviser bill clark asked me to explain some of the things that are going on in space, which i did but as the meeting went on it became clear to me that the president was a little frustrated. he was frustrated that the space policy it taken so long to develop and he was also frustrated that it didn't appear that space policy was being given enough emphasis within his administration and he wanted that change. he wanted an organization to pull together all the sections of the space or graham into one coherent whole. this is what resulted in the senior interagency group for space. one of those acronyms that could only be invented by a bureaucrat in the u.s. government. but not as as some later ones such as the national space

council. but nevertheless it got the job done. it established the national security adviser as the chairman of space. the first time it had ever been done. it established an executive secretary, who is the guy who did most of the dirty work, who tried to bring the agencies together in meeting after meeting after meeting, and we try to bring together all the aspects of space that were going on in the government. that is the civil, the military and the commercial. this was the first time the commercial space sector had been elevated to a level equal to the military. so bringing those together turned out to be quite an experience. the web site of george c. marshall institute says that the ronald reagan administration

arguably had more focus on space and certainly issued more space policy documents than any other administration. so maybe we won the numbers award at least. we issued the presidents -- signed a teen national security directives, what we call an s. pd. these were policy statements, decisions on his part dealing with space during his administration. i was there for all but five of those. i think all of those policy documents reflected the presidents optimism and commitment to demonstrate u.s. leadership and our exceptionalism on multiple fronts. the u.s. space program fit perfectly in his vision of the future for our country.

the tools for executing that vision were provided by an economy that was called the largest peacetime boom in the history of the united states. over 35 million jobs were created from the beginning of his administration to the end. in his state of the union address early during his administration, the president stated that developing the frontier of space would be one of the four major priorities for his administration in the 1980s. that is pretty heavy stuff. i think this was the first time a president had ever spoken that highly of space and in fact the senior interagency group for space was only one of four senior senior interagency groups established by the president. the other three were were on foreign policy, defense and intelligence. to me again that emphasizes the importance he placed on space.

early on in the administration our attention was focused on the shuttle program, obviously because previous policies statements had announced that the shuttle would be the primary system for both the military and the civil sectors of space. immediately after i got into the white house, i became aware of the military's attitude toward their policy which wasn't very friendly. the military had thought that policy before it had been announced. they felt that they were doing perfectly fine with unmanned expendable launch vehicles for getting their satellites into orbit and forcing them on board the shuttle was not something they looked upon favorably. so they weren't real happy with it and the main thing that they weren't happy with was placing primary reliance for the military's access to space on one vehicle, the shuttle.

so one of the first things that we did, that i did, was to arbitrate an agreement between nasa and the department of defense that permitted the department of defense to crank up the production lines for heavy-lift launch vehicles that eventually resulted in the titan four and also agreed that in the context of nasa that the department of defense would continue to use the shuttle for at least a third of its launches. this seems to make both relatively happy. also during our administration we expanded the fleet from the four orbiters approved by the carted administration 25. we permitted the use of the shuttle for foreign and commercial launches, something that hadn't been done before. we encouraged technical assistance and launch assistance

to friendly foreign governments. and these were just a few of the policy statements related to the shuttle. there were many more. perhaps one of the major achievements of our administration i think was to elevate the commercial space program. the president had a great deal of faith in press -- trust in the private sector and he wanted to stimulate entrepreneurship, to get private enterprise going in space and he fell to do that he had to break down a few barriers. so, the first thing he did was issue a statement that promoted private investment in space, and the u.s. contribution to facilitate that. we worked to establish a pricing mechanism for commercial and foreign launches on the shuttle

that needed to -- we needed to balance on the one hand foreign competition. they were heavily subsidizing the launch vehicle so we wanted to make sure the shuttle is competitive against those foreign launchers. that on the one hand. on the other hand, commercial -- in order to stimulate an elv in the united states we could not have a shuttle priced so low that it would not incentivize the investors to invest in those commercial eob's so we had to strike as a single pool of balance in that took many meetings to do. one of the more important things that we did was to permit the use of government ranges and launch facilities for private launches. this resulted in the private industry not having to make the large capital investment in

expenditures in ranges and launch facilities associated with the development of new eob's. clearly, the centerpiece of president reagan's space policy as it regards the military said there was the strategic defense initiative, or as the media coined it, star wars. you have got to love the media. the president had announced this policy on march 23, 1983 in a televised speech to the nation that was supposed to be primarily devoted to the defense budget, and he tagged on at the very end this little thing called the strategic defense initiative. which as he described it, signaled a major shift away from

a policy of our government that relied on mutual assured destruction or as it was appropriately coined, mad, as the primary philosophy for defending our nation, a philosophy that said that the soviet union won't attack the united states because we will have a triad of nuclear offensive systems that could retaliate and vice versa. the president said, this is hogwash. the united states should be able to defend itself. we have the technology to do that. there should be nothing to stand in the way. of the united states implementing, developing and implementing a system that defends us against a nuclear attack. that signaled the beginning of the sdi program that really signaled the shift in space

policy as it regards the military sector. traditionally the department of defense has relied on space systems as what might be called force enhancers. that is systems that support the operating forces with communications and navigation and other things. this policy in effect said that the medium of space can be used to defend our country, what some might call a warfighting capability. although the emphasis was always on nonnuclear capability since the placement of nuclear weapons in space are prohibited by international treaty. some of the original intention of the sdi program did not materialize because the technology didn't materialize.

most obviously sdi today is a ground-based defensive system. many of the technologies that were intended to be developed such as space lasers and various kinetic energy devices didn't really materialize or prove to be the most cost-effective way of defending our country. but we still rely on space systems of course to support sdi as well as other capabilities. in august of 1984 the president issued a national space strategy which reaffirmed the department of defense reliance on space systems as an integral element of its warfighting capability. and one of the things which i don't know that i have ever heard mentioned, the national space strategy directed the department of defense to look at options for elevating the organizational options for elevating the importance of space in the military. this resulted in the formation of the u.s. space command in

colorado springs. the implementing actions associated with the private sector, commercialization of the private sector were also mentioned in the space strategy ended also of course documented his decision earlier on the space station which i will mention and a moment and it announced the formation of a national commission on space and defined the goals that he wanted the commission to do. the centerpiece of the civil space policy was his approval of the international space station program at the request of the nasa administrator, jim beggs at the time and arranged a meeting with the president in april of 83. jim beggs brief the president. the top to the space station being the next logical step beyond the shuttle for the manned space program. he also emphasized the rapid

development of the soyuz space station. if you wanted to give president reagan's attention you talked about the soviet threat and there was a soviet threat to our leadership in the manned space program in the form of that space station. following that study, the president developed or signed a study directive which asked the senior interagency group for space to conduct a study of the permanently manned space station. nasa conducted a dedicated study on the space station headed i a gentleman named john hodge and i was given the responsibility for taking that study, comparing it with other options and presenting that to the president. which i did.

early -- late in 1983, i briefed that to the president and almost, almost all those in the cabinet meeting that day agree that the space station was the logical next step for our country. the presidents approval of the space station was announced in his state of the union address in january of 1984. in 1988, the last year of the reagan presidency, congress passed the law allowing the creation of the national space council, a cabinet level organization which you will hear more about in just a minute. this was a fitting in for the cowboy from california, who used the space program as a symbol of u.s. leadership and a brighter

future for america and the world. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, gil. now we move move onto the george herbert walker bush evisceration where the world changes again. the soviet union disintegrates managing that process in a peaceful manner, certainly is one of the hallmarks of that first bush evisceration. you have the first gulf war, where we began to see in clear terms on national television the integration of space capabilities to enhance american warfighting capabilities. who can forget on cnn seeing the pictures of precision-guided emissions going in a window? that video is seared in the minds of those of us that followed that conflict and it was a perfect illustration of how america had integrated its

space capabilities into its terrestrial warfighting capabilities and some say that recognizance strike complex that the soviets called it that we created and invested and throughout the year ended the cold war operational wise in the first gulf war has fundamentally changed the space policy discourse in particular as it relates to let terry affairs. the bush administration creates the national space council. the first two speakers talked about in various respects how you organize state activities but it was the george herbert walker bush administration that decided this needed to be a cabinet level descendent -- said of decision-making is what the white house you have the national space council chaired by the vice president and you also have the authorship of a space exploration initiative sti, which attempted to define a new course for american space exploration in a post-cold war context where we are not competing with the soviets for

leadership in the absence of the cold war. central to most of these decisions was mark albrecht who is the principle adviser on space to president bush serving as the executive secretary of the national space council during his administration. dr. albrecht. >> good morning and thanks jeff for that introduction. this is a pleasure and i am enjoying this as much as you are. it is interesting to hear the continuity and i want to read ahead to see where the hell we are. i guess in this chapter of the national, u.s. national space policy i would call, this is where it gets interesting. you have heard the from gil president reagan did a remarkable job in leading the nation in the space o. graham. at the end of the cold war and put in play a lot of things that

needed to get an elaborate upon, definitized and operational rise and that really is what happened in the bush administration. as has been said, in 1988, the congress and the nasa authorization bill began to recognize that things were beginning to get calm gated with regard to space and space policy and in fact authorize the president to create a national space council inside his white house. despite the fact that most the white house as everybody on this panel will agree jealously guard executive privilege when congress tells them this is the way you are going to organize and this is who you are going to choose, they tend to bristol with the bush administration, president bush personally decided he was okay with the idea for national space council in the back there was some communications from then vice president to the hill that he would be accommodating to this, so when he came into office in

april of 89, he signed the executive order that established the national space council. there were a variety of things and to follow on from gil, that shaped the space policy issues that the bush and administrations faced right from the beginning. first and foremost, while the ball was teed up and certainly president reagan and his administration was central in ending the cold war, it didn't actually and until the bush administration and that had an enormous consequence for space probe ram. as gill said president reagan in that administration was very much animated by the cold war and the race for the soviet union and at the end of the cold war, that source of motivation was removed. we had a series of concerns right away at the end of the cold war. one was what are we going to do with russian weapons, their

inventories and capabilities? where they going to go? who is in control? who is in charge. how do we incentivize soviet technologists, not too so there know how or components to other nations around the world that in the vacuum of a post-cold war world would have ambitions about creating their own regional power centers. and we also had a problem immediately thereafter which was how to define u.s. national security space requirements and forces post-cold war? again, as gil adequately describe, so much of our national security space forces, policies, structures, strategies were based on the primary competences hit it with the cold war. we now had to say what were the right sort of requirements to meet our objectives and what were our objectives after the cold war? we also had to deal with the

immediate response of congress and the american public for a peace dividend. there was an expectation at the end of the cold war that the dollars spent on our national security now could be saved and returned to the taxpayers and apply applied to other purposes. it is staggering now but in this period of time, then congressman les astin was talking about a 20 to 35% immediate reduction in the dod budget and that is not -- that is not a leveling off. that was a real reduction in the budget so if you had $100 billion last year he was talking about $60 billion. that was going to put an enormous squeeze on the procurement and r&d accounts because you have to pay personnel first, even though if you have a rapid drawdown of forces it will take a while to get men and women out of the services. it will take a wild to stop the necessary all and am and so

while you take a 30% reduction at the top line, the procurement and r&d accounts which are dollars, not people and pay etc., are accelerated so that was sometimes 50 or 60% reduction. that was a significant challenge. we were worried about the technology pipeline closing. gil talk about sti. one of the benefits of sti was that it had another cold war injection of technology, acceleration and the united states. that stories yet to be written but it is remarkable the amount of technology that came out of sdi efforts and optics. there's a whole set of physics and in 1985, our friends and colleagues who are physicists, optics was not considered a very important part of physics. everybody was into nuclear particle physics etc. but the sdi program reenergized the whole optical part of the

physics business and this enormous outflow of technology that has accelerated everything in today's world. we also had a recession. and the recession was looming and we had a president that had made a pledge not to increase taxes and do all with spending cuts. that was a huge problem, and so space was going to take a huge hit or a potentially huge hit out of this. we also had a space launch crisis. right at the interregnum, right between reagan and bush we had the challenger accident. and that took an already fragile as gil described launch picture for the united states and really put us into a crisis mode. the shuttle did not return. the flight was shut down for 32 month so here we had a national launch policy and national launch strategy based on a single threat to space which was

the space shuttle and for the challenger accident 32 month we had no access to space. as gil said and i was up on the hill working for senator pete wilson at the time. pete aldridge deserves -- because he almost single-handedly i don't know what was going on inside the administration but up at the senate armed services committee overmuch objection was able to get what he called the complementary expendable launch vehicle program funded. if we hadn't had that the united states would have were it but -- literally been grounded for almost three years. we also had a situation that nasa with the space shuttle crisis and station freedom that was really beginning to -- moving to building something and we began to understand the program. the shuttle program was in disarray at nasa in 1988.

the space station freedom, which gil neglected to admit that administrator beggs told president reagan it was going to cause eight lien dollars. by 1989 the first time we open the envelope, that was 400% cost increase and it was rapidly escalating. fundamentally when you began to get the on if we understood the number of shuttle flights every year required to assemble the space station was two or three times the annual that had ever been exhibited by the shuttle. the requirement for extravehicular activity which was the design choice, which was to take up big visas and assemble them in space was more and any year, and one year of space station construction was going to be more e. l. d. hours then had them witnessed by all a faring nations together. it exceeded it in one year. so there was really serious

questions about the feasibility of space station freedom as design. the national academy of sciences again, the question is for scientific use of the space station. in fact there were explicit critical coming out of the space station particularly when some of the first trade-off decisions were made a large centrifuge that was going to allow the creation of all kinds of life science experiments. they call the marginal. we have the beginning of unhappy international partners, who had gleefully signed up to be part of the space station freedom program but as that program began to evolve and the interactions and the decisions they realize there were less partners and subcontractors and there was real unhappiness being expressed about that. and the planetary program and the great observatory programs have been put on hold for the 32 month hiatus on nasa was in a situation of defocused unstable

programs. but that is not all. there was at this time the beginnings of a very serious concern about global climate change. and there was a very strong initiative on the part of the hill and from outside academic communities that infect the united states should have a heavy emphasis on global change. global climate change in the way it was coming to us was that the problem was so critical and the tangible and crucial future of the world, that we needed to act first and study as we were allowed to. so we were faced with global climate change steamroller coming down the hill that expected the space roper and to not start studying it but in fact implementing large programs

and lower orbit to begin providing data to actually start acting on global climate change. the eos, the earth observing satellite system which was right at the end of the reagan administration was started at nasa, was designing to gigantic platforms both in excess of a billion dollars. it was going to take 10 or 12 years to develop them. again, it was the result of the enthusiasm in the science community and it was also the nasa culture. when there was money to be had, and there was a big citing new projects they embraced it heartily. as gil said we also had an emerging commercial space market. is something that has been on the horizon with the carter administration. it was embraced in the reagan administration trying to create the fertile ground for it to grow. by the time we arrived there was $5 billion a year of actual commercial space business and it was beginning to get complicated.

rules of the road, with the proper role of the government is, how to run direct with other countries, what we expected, what the role of government chelation of commercial services was. so that was clearly a large contributing source. all those things were the now it gets comp a gated vision of where we found space policy in space needs. as we said before we had a national space council. the president was interested in the area of it and so he was more than happy to have one. we had great relations and as each one of these guys will tell you, the chemistry inside the white house makes a big difference on what can be done and how it is done. if there is internal wrangling for a variety of reasons, things get hard. if there is comity and if there is clarity and there is unity than a lot of good things can happen. we had clearly comity and unity in the bush white house. brent scowcroft is a terrific

guy. he clearly deferred to us on space matters. obviously they are national security and intelligence matters that require the nfc to be a joint partner in all of these things. he had low ego, enormous energy and there were a lot of issues that he was focused on elsewhere with the end of the cold war. ost p., science technology policy is where i presided. in our case we had allen bromley, a terrific i. he was very focused on the superconducting super collider project in texas. it was really his main focus. we also had a variety of things on biometrics that really focused and allen was more than willing to let the space council take the lead. dollars matter. darman was her drifter of omb and he was a bona fide space i. he loved space, very energetic

and extremely brilliant guy. and as long as we stayed within the certain boundaries, he was an actual ally. he did some really remarkable things when he was that omb. john sununu for crying out loud was a scientist and he if he reminded us on that occasion went to graduate school on a nasa scholarship and so he certainly was enthusiastic. and it turned out to be one of the two most primary policy of the vice president so we had all the ingredients to make the space council active and engaged on all of the topics. so it worked very well. we ran it just like the nfc. we had regular meetings. we had meetings with the principles, deputies. we had had a variety of committees formed a etc. to go deal with issues that i described in the very beginning. our primary policy focus, the first direction of the president

was keep the u.s. out in front in space. as the cold war -- the leadership was not just a consequence of the cold war, not just a reaction to the soviet space graham that in fact u.s. space leadership had salience and importance for the country going forward and that we were to taylor for design the policies of the administration to ensure u.s.-based leadership given the changing circumstances. probably the most significant thing we have focused on with the space expiration initiative and it is very complicated. but the basic tenets were that all the problems that we saw, with problems from the u.s. domestic economic to technology pipeline etc. were at risk in the president's mind with the end of the cold war. that in fact with the rapid reduction of expenditures in defense, the heavy leverage, to

deleveraging on r&d and procurement would really put the united states added technological disadvantage to one of the primary motivations is support for america even outside the context of the cold war. second, that the technology driver, the historic technology driver of space and national security space it played in the previous 30 years really need to be sustained and in fact a bold new initiative in space expiration would be a way to continue that fly will of technology going in the future. international leadership post-cold war. again, it is now a truism that at the time the sheep was blank about what world leadership and, with the new world order was going to be as president was wrote in his book with brent scowcroft, a world transformed. to space expiration initiative

was a vision of how the united states could show leadership, could in fact provide positive global leadership in an area that talked about technology and economic benefits to all nations and most importantly division from the very beginning included, including russia and the soviet union and now russia, in the mix and in fact not just as an adjunct as a lot of participants in the space station program had been but as a real partner. it turned out that leverage really was used with great success in the clinton administration where those initiatives and that vision were really put to great use for different purposes and i will let richard tell you about that. we wanted to refocus the entire civil space program, the shuttle station as i said was very confiscated and we began to look at the real structure of the probe ran. you had it in with the national

academy about the value of the science. you began to see that we didn't call it that but it has been termed a dead-end program, stuck in lower orbit doing science that was not in endorsed by the national academy of science and its budget pressures continued and the program do not necessarily -- we fill that would overtime things like a centrifuge being reduced first and finally eliminated, that in fact we needed to reorient the entire civil space program. we also, many of us were believers. some have taken heat for it, but we believe that some of the concepts associated with the strategic defense initiative were applicable to what was then an aging civil space program. we called it faster, cheaper, better. i think richard and the clinton administration morphed it into a different way and that is great, but we believe there were ways to do things in space that really could give us better

technology, faster and in fact in doing it better and faster, it would eat done more cheaply. we also wanted the industry, the defense and aerospace industry to pay that after the cold war from its focus on supplying national security needs to an ambitious civil space program. we then is another policy initiative, took our new launch capability. the shuttle as i said, had gone through a lot of fits and starts. it was a very expensive program. magnificent technology and extraordinary capability but it was fragile and it was expensive and with the incident of the challenger, even though they flew eight times after he returned to flight and 88 in september of 88, it flew eight times in the next year but within 18 months we were stood down again for month after month after month with hydrogen leaks etc.. is just a very complex system.

we had the ceo of the program the type that gil described. very expensive, very delicate. 18 months on the pad. we needed a new launch system. we needed our national security purposes and we wanted it for civil space purposes. we wanted it flexible, robust. we wanted it very affordable, decibel and we spent a lot of time and energy on that program. and a lot of money. we looked at a national aerospace plan, something president reagan did mired with the idea of going from los angeles and tokyo in three hours and ultimately be able to sustain orbital flight in a vehicle that would he is single staged orbit which as you well know is more or less the holy grail of the space launch business. we made an important policy decisions with regard to the shuttle. when they came in a the 1980s there was a request for an additional orbiter by nasa and

after we went through this entire plan of putting together an overall program, decided that additional shuttles were not going to be the way we wanted to go. this very difficult and and a think as we will see with some of the speakers that will go down the chain, if you keep the baseline program intact and then try to do something new, i will cut to the end of the story. you can do both and it is very hard to stop. believe me, it is very hard to stop and everyone here is have this experience. i am eager to hear from her colleagues further on down the chain. is very hard to stop once you start. we stop the space shuttle program and our view was that it would stop in 2005. and it turns out it looks like it is going to be 2011. that is pretty good as they say. okay, let's see. new launch.

okay. again, a skill set and art a commercial space was growing. it was $5 billion a year when we are there. there were a lot of policy decisions made that were clearly on the side of encouraging commercial space but there a lot of detailed implementing policies that needed to be rolled out and we spent a lot of time on that. it was a serious policy focus. just defining what the role of government and what the responsibilities of government were dealing with the issue of subsidized development and operations as opposed to non-subsidized. again, it is in the kind of grind it out face of government, and a real estate work was done by presidents reagan and carter -- carter recognizing this would be an important part of the american space future but it was left to the bush and administrations to start providing the rules of the road. that was a large policy benefit in this administration. we restructured the climate change program. we were able to use independent

commissions etc. to say hey, study first and then take action. so we didn't need to do everything at once with climate change. big problem, important problem, urgent problem but in fact it was better to build multiple small platforms to start collecting data on climate change rather than wait for 10 years for a multi-million dollar program that was going to collect data on everything and start providing it. you guys remember the eos disc program, some of the original ideas for the amount of data designed to come down to the earth daily was staggering although it is probably in a handheld today. finally i would like to say that desert storm really helped solidify national space policy, national security space policy. we had a space policy national security space program that was primary design to prosecute a

potential war with the soviet union and we all felt all those activities and nuclear attacks etc.. desert storm really began to show how all those systems that had been designed could be used and complex far short of a major conflict with the soviet union. that could involve nuclear weapons and in fact that establish the beginnings of a policy about what should be our national space policy with regard to national security. we needed that they were absolutely critical to military operations whether they were small or large. that was new. that they were necessary, and they needed to be sustained, modernized and they had to be protected. so all of a sudden we crossed over the line. are talked about a missed opportunity and obviously we had one, where we could have signed up for an arms control agreement with that. i think by the time desert storm

occurred, it became clear that arms control would be very difficult if the united states national security apparatus was to be as reliant on space assets it was clearly designated to be in desert storm. chuck horner who was the allied commander of air force in desert storm called desert storm the first space war between navigation, real-time recognizance communication. it became very clear that u.s. military forces in the future would operate on about don't have space divided capability. not cold war space provided capability but new space capability involved in doing military operations around the world 24/7 in regions that could not be predetermined or pre-positions for. this is really new and important and we spent a lot of time on that. they asked about what were some of the impediments? we had a lot to do with -- -- we

focused on water policy areas. as you can see there is a lineage to all of this. we did have impediments and i think it is really important to get them on the table as part of the space policy and space program history and it is best summarized in my opinion by a chapter or a paragraph in the final report we provided the president january of 1993 that said, and here is talking about the space launch and what we wanted to do with the space launch but it really applies to a lot of things across the board. during the intervening five years, efforts to secure support for a new launch system have been largely unsuccessful. the failure of our institutions, u.s. government agencies, congress and aerospace companies to converge and agreed to support and fund a new launch system not only short-sighted but will prevent us from achieving many if not most of our long-term space objectives.

that is something that is worthy of discussion because that is a recurring thing. missed opportunity. we do have a missed opportunity. when we came and senator william proxmire had put in the appropriations bill evercore meant that the president had to certify within 30 days of being sworn in his intentions on space station freedom. senator proxmire was not a fan of space station freedom. turns out that the time is so fast and i think all of our colleagues will attest to that, the time is so fast you are playing doubletime, triple time anywhere in the white house. it seems to be a blur in move at the speed apply. 30-day injunction after swearing-in i was sworn in on march 1 of 1989, and they were already 10 days into the period of time. we didn't even have an office. long story short we ended up

working quickly and getting the president to the congress certifying space station freedom. it was an opportunity missed. up we had done a zero-based review, it is arguable whether at that time and in that place the system would have stood still for that. it is debatable but it is a regret i've had and i talked to both vice president about it and given the way things will that eventually on the space station had to be done it might've made things different so that is a small i think missed opportunity. so what were the significant achievements of the bush and administrations in my opinion? first and foremost we defined post-cold war national security space framework that sustains today. i think you take a direct line from that because before it was cold war national security space policy and strategy and afterwards was a post-cold war

world. space is vital to military operations. it must be protected and cannot be threatened. critical. we created a policy for commercial space commerce that is sustained today. good -- that government supports utilizes and protects u.s. commercial space enterprise. we initiated cooperation with the russians. it was modest by the end of the bush and administrations. we have agreed for the shuttle him mir program that had been in the works for about three years, but desert storm intervened, and eventually before the president left, we signed with horace yeltsin an agreement to fly cosmonauts on the shuttle and put u.s. astronauts on space station mir and that opened up the opportunities for a lot of cooperation, very positive on the u.s. side. i want to talk just briefly because i'm going to be a little controversial here.

i think a largely unintended but perhaps the most significant policy initiative by the bush administration unintended but potentially the most significant was when we convened the advisory commission of the future of the united states space program the so-called augustine commissioned one. long story, if you want that story by the way i have a book coming out. in another three weeks called calling back buried the first-hand account of the great space race in the end of the cold war. you can read in detail about that. the augustine commission even though it was designed to focus on specific issues of nafta and mass organizations, the space exploration initiative, space station freedom and the shuttle had the unintended but significant consequence in my mind of creating the intellectual and programmatic

framework for nasa post-cold war that was based primarily upon our wallet, not our will. .. of free enterprise in the

human space flight program. i think it's a tragedy and something that needs to be rethought, but i think at this -- as we look down the list, i look at the bush administration, the end of cold war when the human space flight in the united states essentially was terminated. with that i look forward to questions. [applause] >> next week of the clinton administration the new globalization, a real emergence of terrorism and the bombing of the uss coal, cruise missile strikes and afghanistan with somalia, the bosnian war, we also have the rise to china and to have the rise of satellite services to the consumer. i know during the clinton

administration, and i think we have somebody from the systems here bought my first satellite dish from directv services and i think several thousand others of course the united states by the end of the decade into the millions we have two gentlemen. richard under the clinton administration with assistant director for aeronautics and space in the white house office of science and technology policy. we also have steve, a senior policy adviser for space and aviation in the white house office of science and technology policy. one small caveat, ausley note steve has a deadline of in terms of time he has to make a critical phone call at a specific time and depending how rich vose we will either have

rich so low so what we handed over to rich. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to be here, and to echo what mark said to listen to this fascinating story as it on spills across the time, i think clearly one of the things we are sharing which ensure will continue with the other speakers is that although the administration's change in focus sometimes significantly have some very stable themes running through this story, and there's things that started in the kennedy had been a station that continue now we into the obama administration, and i think the organizers and thank you very much to the space enterprise council in the marshall

institute for conceptualize and this interesting event. one of the things organizers ask us to spend time talking about context and each of the speakers before it on a wonderful job reminding us what it was like to live and make decisions in those times. and i think at the end of march was trying to be controversial, but he's putting his finger on an important fact that we're we are today in society and the economy and the place in the world, some things that were possible during the kennedy were the ronald reagan administration are not going to happen again. there are significant changes that have changed the context where we are so what we want as a nation out of our space program and who we expect to do those things are going to be altered as we go forward in the future. the clinton met administration again and each administration as we've already seen, you don't invent the world view, the world is as it is when you take over

you may have won the office with an orientation. ronald reagan certainly was an orientation of strong leadership and a goal to express' a unique american voice in the world. the clinton administration not quite so dramatic. looking around the room, i guess about half of you were around and thinking about the administration's when this happened coming at the other half of you were probably not, but if you recall the big praise in the clinton election was it's the economy, stupid. it was a goal to refocus america on america, and now the interesting -- and interest in the context where we are in the budget today a really hard focus on the budget realities. we had a young with all due respect slightly disorganized president, tremendously

creative, a converse first space and then republican congress after some significant steps on the part of the administration and a free interest focusing this is the period that we shut the government down so there was a lot of looking inward at this time. the things mark talked about are still fundamental when the clinton administration comes in, you have a winding down of cold war and a very serious concern with what was going to happen to all the very talented soviet scientists and engineers. there was a lot of concern, as has already been mentioned, the concept of terrorism, and the fear over the issue of loose nukes. as a great deal of the energy, and i will talk about the organization in imminent but a good deal of the energy and thinking about space in the white house and clinton

administration was in the office of the vice president and vice president gore had a very strong concern about what we could positively deutsch to effect change within and this was limited in the white house, the united states congress was also deeply engaged in this issue, but certainly one of the things that happened is because of the world situation there was a renewed focus on trying to engage the russians again as mark said a dialogue which had begun in the bush administration was than broadly expanded trying to bring the russians more fully into the space station. it was not without -- it was not without its bumps and bruises as the cultures delight it in a very significant way. you had the u.s., which like to do things its way, and the russians who also at the time were in the middle of a significant financial and political crisis or of course

very proud people and very proud of their tradition in space exploration, so the two cultures colliding in unlikely places like houston was always an exciting thing to watch. i think another big thing which we have seen gil rye described very well the atmosphere and the goal of the reagan administration and rolling out these big themes, the star wars initiative, the national aerospace plane, and then for the bush administration's strategic, sorry, space exploration issue, and i think in all honesty what you saw in the clinton administration was a realization, again, renewed focus on the economy, the budget, the realization of what these, certainly there were always ideologues and people come to a position with an already prefixed mindset about it, but i think also there was a realization that the technical

level just how massive these programs were. we've spent a lot of money on these issues, and we haven't made it very much progress. turns out the national aerospace plane which is a great idea and perhaps someday will be implemented we just simply didn't have the technology to do it. the same with -- we were now -- we've gone a substantial amount of spending on the the strategic initiative since it was first announced by president reagan, and we still see the complexity of that. there are people who argue if you would spend more you'd make greater progress but these are monumental issues and can you make progress the issue is what is the percentage of the country is wealth you want to spend on any given thing. and again, coming back to this issue of the renewed focus on the budget and the clinton administration if you will recall which of the budget and a wasn't just clinton

administration it was the assistance of a republican congress, we drove from a significant budget deficit to an actual surplus when the clinton administration left office. at the same time another thing was reinventing the government rightly or wrongly, and it's interesting now in light of the tea party and the other things to think about these roles and ronald reagan was pushing large government programs, the clinton administration was talking about reducing the size of government sweep of these strange reversals that happen as we go through time and one of the themes that was i think planted in the bush administration was again plead out fully in the clinton administration there was a sense that we title ourselves up in

endless bureaucracy and they're ought to be a way to move through technology in a more crisp fashion. and again, the key environmental aspect of the clinton administration was to understand this was the birth of the internet. i remember physically seen the engineers come and hook up the first line to the white house. so prior to that, we were communicating over regular telephone wires. so we all got internet on our desks at the white house, and to think at the same time the tremendous explosion the.com revolution that was happening, and there was a great sense of the vitality of the american entrepreneur, there was a company being born every minute, so some of those now have gone away but some of the large icons remain so i think there was a

sense of vitality and youth and i think a little bit i have to be honest the sense was space was not as exciting as all this, it was too slow, the bureaucratic, too expensive, there was some second and third guessing about the ultimate value of investment in space. during this time the united states congress have a moment of doubt too about the space station. there was a vote in the house and the space station passed by one vote. so there was a thinking at this time the space station might simply have gone away. but devotee to reenergize the whole purpose and the vice president's office got involved, and sort of reoriented the thinking about the space station as a fully international space station in a way which has actually paid out handsomely particularly now as we first of

all the russians made a significant contribution over the years but important now as we wind down the space shuttle program the russians will for a while be the only access we have to the space station. i want to talk -- let me just talk about the wins and losses if i could. but we talk about organization first and then wins and losses and if you heard we started out with the space in the carter and zero cpni gail talked about the process and then the process grew in a way in conjunction with congress to the national space council. there was a sense going back to the reinventing government at the white house had gone to a large that there were too many white house and white house related advisory groups, and

whether it was wise or unwise we could have the discussion there was a goal to cut the white house by 25%. as a part of that initiative, they decided to take a step back from the space council and said this is and just like any other complicated issue. we don't really need a space council, and so what happened was the responsibility for space went back but of it was done by dr. gibbons who was a scientist and a physicist and i think that his passion for this was perhaps less than his passion for science, and so i think that reflected some of the decision making reflected his leadership on this. of course we always have the full involvement of vice president gore but in the organization the sort of a day

to day came back which meant something very critical towns marrec pointed out at this time in history there was also an extremely important national security space program and what this meant is that you did bifurcate the world's in a way again so that is one of the team and so is steve so we were brought over to the white house and our primary focus of all space and nasa so we didn't have the same focus they did. we didn't have a sense that our portfolio was all of space that's not a good thing. what did they or do you ought to do a space council again i think there are pluses and minuses, but i think that not having a coherent vision is important in our focus was not on the national security space program, and i think if you come to this enterprise with that narrow scope, you can't see the whole picture because there is a tremendous amount that happens on that saw it. so i think that an organization

does ultimately matter. we made the decision so really you had a triumph in the white house, the office of science and technology policy had the responsibility but there were many large decisions kendal dwight economic council and there were many large decisions and large dollar decisions that were handled so divided the responsibility is again to read wins and losses and then i think i will wind up. i think the biggest win without question was the clinton administration's decision on the gps program. certainly we can't take credit for the program itself which had been the product of many presidents and much investment and some very wise decisions on the part of the department of finance to become defense to invest in this technology but the clinton administration had a fundamental decision to make, which is is this something that we want -- you probably don't recall the time they were dithering the signal. so to make it impossible to get

an accurate signal out of the gps, there are actively involved in the system that for every one except the military. the question the rest asking is are we going to make gps are we going to pay for it and make it a global utility come is the united states going to give to the world this incredible toole every soccer mom and dad in america uses the field on saturday and sunday now and we couldn't -- all of us have it now embedded in our mobile devices, as we couldn't find a starbucks without it prieta but we made that decision, and it wasn't without controversy and i think that was perhaps our best and most important decision. i think bringing the russians into the space station there's a lot to be said about whether the space station is a good idea or not in history will write and hopefully mark's book will cover some of this, but bringing the

russians and i think was an unqualified good move. there was a lot of creative work that was done on the air traffic and i think steve is coming back, so i will not talk about the air traffic modernization program. i think an important, complicated but important thing the clinton administration did was to privatize the entities. they were basically intergovernmental organizations. they were owned by the government, and so the clinton administration came and said this doesn't make sense. why do we have government organizations providing a commercial service globally when companies can do this easily which is very controversial at that time, very, very little support from other countries when it was first announced but i think it has paid off handsomely and both companies have survived, prospered and continue to offer generations of

the surface in ways that are fundamentally improved life or on the plan at cony and i think there's a lot that can be said of the planetary science program and again this has been mentioned by several speakers. the question of getting the space station and plancher science program to a place where it was sustainable over a long period of time was a challenge and it was one where the white house and the congress had to work together, and i think by and large that's turned out well. there were some big losses unfortunately some big lessons or perhaps the biggest loss was the program. we encourage the consolidation of the military and civilian whether. they met with mixed nasa and

know what and dod to agree on a systemic group phenomenally out of the budget just went haywire and the requirements for the system or uncontrolled in a way that the spending went dramatically out control and eventually the program had to be killed and separated, so there was a big loss. or passion about the program. a single stage to orbit i learned a very important lesson which is about policy never trump's physics. so you can say whatever you want, but if you can't do it coming and we wanted to build a single stage door -- to the orbit and the camera with a beautiful concept that looked like the future we just didn't

have the technology. and ultimately we did not have the will either. >> i wouldn't say that national security space was a loss under our -- under the administration. i think a lot of great programs were developed, but i can't really take credit for any of that is what i am saying. there were a lot of good people working and we were not really deeply involved in that, so i think with that i will wrap it up again this is a fascinating exercise and i look forward to hearing how the story is going to end. [applause] thank you, richard. now we are at the second bush administration of george will you bush where the world begins to change again you have one of the interesting perspectives i

think on the bush administration at this time is the importance of expectations. secretary rumsfeld comes and assumes control of the defense department, but he had just been the chair of two other commissions in the latter portions of the clinton administration. those commissions one on missile defense and the ever concerned with space management organization set expectations for how the community at large of the space policy in certain defense policies as related to missile defense were going to leave off. the rumsfeld missile defense commission outlined a very aggressive, very aggressive set of programs including some elements of return to the strategic defense initiative used in space. the rumsfeld space commission talks in great detail about the failing of the organizational process, but the importance also of space to the national security mission and warns of space per harbor. the expectation on the part of

the community that was then observing the decisions of rumsfeld defense department and the bush defense -- bush national security policy writ large that it expects the movement in the policy and movement in the budget along the lines predicted by the two commissions of course the of the changes. we have the terrorist act of 2001, the subsequent war in iraq and afghanistan, which divert attention and resources on to the immediate critical national priorities and perhaps shift attention away from these policy movements by we thought would happen. you have the vision for space exploration that comes out in 2004, which again attempt to define a new path or new set of priorities for american space exploration, and you have a deterioration in economic conditions in the second half of the bush administrations. all of these things then affect this base decisions essential

again to the decisions where borat alexandre serves as the advisor on this base issues of the white house office of science and technology policy bridging the clinton administration over to the george w. bush administration and while he was at the white house he served as one of the principle offers for the division of space exploration. >> thanks very much, jeff. as you mentioned, i have the pleasure of being there at the end of the clinton administration through the transition of the election that lasted 35 days and then the transition to the bush administration, and that period of turmoil we thought would taper off into an administration that moved out in lockstep on the new lines of the rumsfeld commission talked about the national security, space and

other issues. obviously in the first year with 9/11 it didn't happen that way. overcome by defense is a good way to describe the reality on the ground in terms of the making of space policy and the use of space so would you have throughout the rest of food for a administration the next seven years really is a reality of the germanic increase and the use of space for national security purposes, space being at the forefront of those issues and those activities afghanistan, iraq, a global war on terrorism of the rest of the world as well, and at the same time a space policy than that is trying to reflect that as opposed to lead so when the national space policy comes out in 2006, it is

also not this similar in fact almost identical to the previous policies, it is viewed not only by the administration but it is viewed by the rest of the world us fundamentally different through a new lens. it is viewed as more bellicose, more unilateral things the rest of the world viewed as hallmarks of the bush administration. so backing up before that, there was a reality, as i said, in the use of national security purposes on the civil side the reality on the route was the columbia accident. fenty refers to 2,003 changed everything from the civil space perspective. it changed, with came a recognition of the civil human

spaceflight program as being fundamentally different than we had fought whereas the committee thought it was more of an operational system that had people in space on the space station and that presence. it was working toward scientific goals and begin the light of columbia people said what are we doing, we are not going anywhere why aren't we fly in something that we have been flying for 25 years, we need to change this paradigm. and i think an accident like that instantly changes the paradigm for the folks watching at. one of the very first actions the bush administration took command this was before 9/11, with regard to the civil space program, was on everybody's favorite program, the space station program, so throughout the clinton administration when the program was finally solidified from the political

perspective, by bringing the russians in at the same time, every two years there was a budget overrun or cost growth of multiple billions of dollars and it always had to be worked out, and bali and oppression of those battles was that in the and the schedule skipped but nasa but the same content for the station, some minor changes here and there. at the beginning of the bush administration there was a 4 billion-dollar i believe it was overrun on space station that was presented to the omb within the first couple of months and the result of that was omb and the white house pushed back and said you don't get any more money. you don't get, you know, to keep the content. to have to cut the content to meet your goal. the result of mo was called the u.s. court complete, which dramatically reduced the

capability of the station, kept a lot of the scientific things the folks wanted of the habitation modules and things like that that were no longer part of it coming and then over the next year the u.s. court completely more often to the international court complete because it sounded like we were not going to allow the international partners to bring that the modules with of course that was always part of the plan was to let them continue that part of the program, too, so it was a fundamental budget reality that when the administration tried to instill in the programs. along with that, the oncoming administrator dan goldin who'd been there for ten years started under bush 41 was there for the entire clinton administration and beginning in boesh 43 was replaced by sean o'keefe who had been the deputy director of the office of management and budget

for the first nine months, nine to 12 months of the bush administration, and so it was a recognition to put in place a manager, program manager, someone who can manage budgets come off a space person cannot an astronaut, someone who is sort of in and of the program itself, and i think that really said where the bush administration was going. you mentioned of the columbia accident, and that really fundamentally change everything from the bush administration's a few of the civil space program. there had been an ongoing review of the space policies and a remote sensing policy that had come out or was about to come out space transportation policy was 99% done a meeting on the

last issue between ns si come osd p.m. the nasa administrator o'keefe that happened on wednesday when columbia was in the world it to become -- in orbit. at the end of the meeting we thought we had come to agreement and the policy was done and that saturday morning everything changed, and we ended up putting off the space transportation policy and redoing it two years later, so i had the pleasure of writing that policy twice, leading the interagency twice with 50 people around the room twice for a year each time. you know, and i bring that up because the administration, the obama administration kicked off its transportation policy review, and i'm so glad that it's them and not me. [laughter] but i did enjoy that process. there's two things about the

columbia accident and what came out of it that led towards the vision that i think is important. one is that the columbia accident investigation board came out in august, and we have no net leading up to that, but it came out and said some very important things and there was a late add to the investigation board were to focus on policy instead of just the technical reasons why the accident happened but that made a lot of us in the white house nervous because now you're going to broaden it from here is what actually happened to here's why it happened and start pointing fingers and blame, and what they ended up saying and was john larson in particular who was on the committee who wrote a chapter nine, and what it said the outflows of importance was

it was a failure of the national policy, failure of the national leadership that contributed significantly to the accident faugh, but within the organization there was no sense of why we were doing it, where we were going, the importance of it that had been lost. the second thing they said was it wasn't a failure of this particular administration it was national leadership over 40 years the failure of both pennsylvania avenue and both political parties. and there was interesting because i think at of the highest levels of the bush administration with that said was this one is not your fault, but if you don't change something now there will be another accident, and about one will be your fault. you may be out of office, it may happen ten years from now but the figure will be pointed back at you and say you didn't do anything about it. and i think from the very beginning after columbia about

three weeks after the accident most of the pieces were being picked up literally down in texas. restore to this small group of folks to see what does this mean for the program? for human space flight in general, and there were folks that said we shouldn't be doing this, we don't have a rationale to do it anymore, we don't -- it's too much money, we don't have the money. and president bush on that day of the accident have come back from camp david and said something important in his speech that he made. he said we are going to keep doing this because it's important. he didn't say we're going to keep flying of the shuttle's or any specifics like that but we are going to keep doing this because this is important, part of the american character, and that was useful, so i carried

the speech around the next two months and people said we shouldn't be giving it i would say you don't get a vote so let's figure out what we are going to come off if we are going to do it. and that was powerful core of leased it stiffened up my spine and a lot in a lot of those conversations. consequently i almost got fired two times the you've got to stick up for what you believe in when you get these opportunities, and i think everybody who has been up here today understands when you get the opportunity to walk to lead toward the white house it's an opportunity that number one you can't pass up but it really is something special. so as we were looking at what this meant for the space program in particular, we kept having interactions with senior administration folks, chief of staff in the card, deputy national security adviser steven

had become a national security advisor condoleezza rice and others, and every time we brought them sort of the latest rock of what we were thinking, they didn't say i like that or i don't like that or change this, change that. they said keep working. figure out what you think the right answer is, you know, and bring that back. and i think that was very different than a lot of the administration's behalf active i think. in the end when the decision meeting happened with the president and will be advisers, the vice president, all of the folks the people know in the bush administration were there, karl rove and others, you know, the decision was made not on the basis of wanting political credit because frankly at that time in the administration, you know, they just had gone into

iraq, it wasn't going that well. nobody was thinking this is going to be a kennedy speech moment, and everybody's going to love it, i think the president's father had done that and it hadn't gone so well, but it was a matter of what's the right thing to do, how do we fix this? and therefore all options were on the table. ultimately what i believe most about the vision was that it confirmed was certainly those of us in the space community have always said which is that -- is exploring and going beyond, not operating in a lower orbit and doing things, but once again it put on the table but which had been taken off the table which is that it should be going out and exploring. it also laid the groundwork for turning over the activities to the private sector.

it said it acquired the commercial and international services for cargo to the international space station. later that summer to those in for the aldridge commission that was put in place to get the implementation of a vision came out and said turning over to the private sector right away, and they said it much more elegantly than we did in the policy, and with the clarity of hindsight i think we would have written things quite a bit different in order to make that happen. so with that, the vision became sort of a signature policy direction of the bush administration. there are other policy documents of there was a u.s. space exploration the ultimate issue with the vision which was the vision. there were documents in the space transportation, remote simpson was really the

fundamental shift to allow foreign access to this sensing capabilities and the commercial capabilities to develop was done and i think either in late bush 41 years or early clinton years as pnc 43, which in the and set up a structure of help foreign companies could get access in the u.s. industry was going to be filled the key devotees and after the ten years or so it hadn't developed the way the we thought it would to have a partnership and the government industry and that has worked much better since then as we now have commercial remote sensing companies but for both commercially and in the panhandle for government. now we have a policy and i left one week after the second term

in to into the kitchen every 2005 and at that time we were about 95% of them with the international space policy review that is one of the reasons i felt okay i've been here five years and a good place all that is left is a couple of dotting the eyes and crossing the t's and a signature, and that the document will be out. another two years before the document came out, and the reason for that was there were one or two issues hotly debated between the department of defense and the intelligence community, and when you get those titans locking arms are not flocking arbs' but bunning heads if you will, things take time and so when the policy did come out in 2006, it was

surprising to me how it was viewed by the public, by the community can't buy the international community, while the tone have shifted a little bit in terms of national security priorities versus scientific priority, the national space policy that the head on with the clinton administration had said the office of science technology policy leads it when appropriate we all know what that means, the security council was going to hold on to the national security space issues no matter what. but there's optics with that. the bush administration policy sort of left of those aside and said here's how it is. the substance of the policy

particularly on the outer space, you know, the willingness to enter or not enter into arms control treaties around space, all those things were no different substantively from the clinton administration policy but a couple minor word changes and remember going through the policy meetings on the document at the national security council then and unfortunately couldn't be here today, but going through those documents and saying if you change a single word will be noticed and you must have a good reason why. and in the end of very few words were changed. when people cannot including vice president gore, former vice president al gore said it was fundamental shift in policy and very unilateral in its outcome. i was just surprised because to me it was a very -- it marked a

lot of continuity in the past and there were not a lot of substantive changes. looking ahead for the rest of the of fenestration, the exploration activity for the example, the new red administration had just come and i am sure that jim will talk about this they felt that to be in their view the growth in the program so when we talk about them wins and losses and missed opportunities, obviously the space exploration vision was near and dear to my heart. going back to the moon is going to happen before we go on to mars. i don't dislike the idea of going to an asteroid first but fundamentally almost the same infrastructure and cost if you're going to go to an asteroid versus the moon but we are going to do all these things if we can ever get out of the low earth orbit.

the fundamental shift which didn't happen in the second term of the bush administration but i think is happening now is that shift to have commercial takeover lower orbit so they can get on with the business of exploration so that to me is a missed opportunity in the past administration. so with that, i look forward to your questions and i really have enjoyed what i've heard from the panelists today and the rest of the palace as well. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, brett. that may be the current obama policy team calling to make them comment on the program. there will be taken care of and a second. and the obama administration brings us full circle.

during the obama administration we have the continuing war on terror, campaigns in afghanistan , wrapping up activities in iraq, and a new openness that of the obama administration has pushed forward and openness had been portrayed in the space policy that you will hear about now. more of a focus on international cooperation. and the players in the industrial base of only the company's that focus on the programs of the record, but also the emergence of the entrepreneurial and the commercial space companies.

to talk about the obama policy, we have two gentlemen to date. first, we have jim commission has a lengthy resume but i will focus on his crime, focusing on the policy, and that was as the chief of staff for the obama white house, the chief of staff for the office of science and technology policy. following jim we have peter marquez who served under both the bush and the obama at fenestration working space policy come and ask that time he was the director of the state policy at the white house. first we are going to start with jim. >> thank you, david, and it's great to be here in the sea so many folks. the great thing about making the space policy as you move forward

is your ability to stand on the shoulders of giants, and here we have some of the giants of space policy previous and it's just wonderful to hear this and i think you're going to hear this continuity of progress of routt, and i was lucky as well to spend eight years in the clinton white house with the vice president's office where he would come out of the senate commerce committee where he shared the space committee and was great because she was engaged in the space policy and had a passion and the only thing better than having a vice president who was passionate about a vigorous space policy was having a president who was passionate about having a vigorous policy and that's what we had in the obama white house. but to give you a little context and this is of course recent history is we came into office at a time when benefits of space have completely permeated almost

every aspect of our lives. from the iphone on my belt to the navigation system that brought us here to the google earth that on my laptop, every day our life is now touched by space and it's become even more vital to our economy, our national security, to our environment, and yet we faced for immediate challenges in space when we first came into office. we face a sputnik moment and it's fitting that the president used a space metaphor to describe where america was in fact at that moment and we came in in the midst of a recession. we were focused like a laser on creating the jobs and new industries of the future. we knew that coming out of world

war ii, half of economic growth came from innovation but at the same time i think we were concerned we had fallen behind in a few key indicators, so for civil american 15-year-olds ranked 25th in math and 21st in science when compared to other nations around the world, so we knew we needed to crank up the innovation in jim. number two, we were faced with the imminent retirement of the space shuttle which the bush administration set at the end of 2010. the gao had highlighted for whoever won the election last time that this would be one of the key 13 issues in the administration would need to look at and get under the hood and figure out because there wasn't an adequate strategy going forward. furred, the other issue that we face is the critical environmental science and technological innovation efforts

have been crowded out with them the budget by an ever growing human spaceflight effort and other challenges and and it was costing in terms of the great opportunities i think that we saw in space command on the national security site after 50 years of increasing use of space, space was getting more congestion, contested, competitive and in fact 60 nations now have a presence in 2015 there will be 9,000 satellites with transponders in the sky overhead or so cluttered that if you have major collisions you can actually render orbits and usable. at the same time, we knew that as others have described, we have big space programs that have this tendency to have these huge cost growth's ago we out in years and we knew we needed a

new acquisition strategy, and we knew we needed to partner with a private-sector in new ways and partner internationally, and we are also focused on bringing a new openness and transparency to what we did globally in space and everything we did the president really challenged us for a bigger vision, bold action for a brighter future and he picked up the phrase we needed to win the future and that applied to what we were doing in space as well so like the response to sputnik, and we often think back in 1957 in those early space years we have a space race there were several components to that, investments in space, but we also needed to invest in our human capacity and basic research and basic research and technological development. we needed to help in of age, how to build and out in educate the world, so the president set a

goal of boosting our efforts to 3% of gdp. for folks who don't remember, that was the amount of research we were doing at the height of the space race and we have not come back to that level yet so we said this broader goal and made historic investments in that area to back it up, and he leave out plans to move from the middle of the pack to the bottom of the world in terms of education and i think people forget that the apollo 11 in the mission control the average age was 26-years-old, yet today the average age is around 50. and so, we knew we needed to take a look at this new generation of space heaters and scientists to get involved and unfortunately today the average middle school kids would rather take out the trash, go to the dentist before doing their math homework or instead of doing

their math homework, and we knew that we needed to do better so we launched a couple of initiatives early on. we brought together the space community and others to change the equation 100 ceos to transform the way teachers teach and students learn to create more makers commodores and dreamers, the president hosted an astronomy night on the south lawn of the white house to get kids focused, but our biggest challenge really was on the civilian side of space in addition to kind of building the building blocks. so the congressional budget office, the general accounting office both highlighted a growing number of challenges with nasa's constellation program i don't think we knew the ret or the scope of the challenges would be facing a bit. brett diluted some of those challenges and so we took a page and out of the clinton

administration and bush and the clinton administration had these challenges i think with the space station freedom and cost growth that i think mark referred to. the clinton administration set up a commission of outside experts to get under the hood and take a look at it, and we borrowed norm augustine who i think also mark referred to and we put him back into service and brought together astronauts and engineers and space experts to take a look at this program and get under the hood. they held meetings all across the country and sought input all over the place and they came back to us and in space terms the kind of sick houston we have a problem, and we were actually really surprised at the kind of scope of what they found. we were billions over budget coming years behind schedule, unable to get us back to the noon on any reasonable time frame and the program had become fundamentally an executable, so we were surprised and we knew

that it was our job and that we could do better so in the result of the augustine committee, we embarked on the new effort to explore the new worlds, create new jobs, develop innovative technology, foster the new industries, strengthen international partnerships and increase our understanding of the universe. and the recommendations and cruel lessons from the decisions of many of these administrations that passed before so first and foremost was the shuttle as borat mentioned the bush administration made the decision to retire the shuttle at the end of 2010. there was a tough decision on their part but as marks points out, it's very difficult to fund and a regional program when you can't find a replacement program on top of it. it's a challenge. sometimes they have to be done sequentially and the was part of the challenge that led to the challenges we face when we came

into the office, but the bush and administration made the decision to retire the shovel and we said okay instead of putting a time stamp on, one of the things we saw in the safety is if you drive the shuttle launches just by arbitrary time table you can run into safety problems so we decided to out more money and the safe and prudent way be added a couple of flights, but we are nearing the end of that incredible program soon sold $100 billion space station week and grew up on some of the lessons from previous administrations. i think reagan had initially kicked off this effort was when this thing started. clinton pulled the dog of the fire and safety by one vote. the challenges we saw was that this program was going to have to be dumped into the ocean to pay for a follow-on program and we were concerned after all this investment and time and putting

it together before we had actually turned it into a scientific lab which was part of the original design that we would have had to be orbited and so we decided to give it a new lease on life and another ten years while also enhancing its utilization. and beyond the lower sorted this is at least one of the holy grails in space and we set out to go places man had never gone before on a more flexible have which is what the augustine committee talked about why also matching i think importantly means with mission. but augustine found one of the things we have done is we have vastly underestimated over the decades and the new technologies that we needed to go beyond the earth and the moon cradle and we went back and looked at one of the reports the first bush administration did and all of the new technologies they had outlined that we would need to go to mars and we actually found

that these are the exact same technologies we need today. we haven't invested in the new technologies to take us further, faster and farther into space, and someone during the process developed a chart that showed if we wanted to go to mars for example, it was going to take the lifting weights of 12th international space stations, and a combined weight is what it amounted to, and again one international space station have required all the space shuttle flights to get there, 12 times that was massive, but that with new technologies you could dramatically reduce that wheat that you would need from 12 down to the two international space stations but that took things like in orbit refueling, and other new technologies that we hadn't yet really focused on or

pushed for, so we sought to push the frontier of innovation within the space program and develop these technologies before making a decision in terms of what type of heavy lift architecture we would pursue. ..

u.s. astronaut un-american dave spacecraft and ending the outsourcing of this were to foreign governments and recommend a new commercial crew effort to harness american hochberg nor should think tentatively signed the fastest possible development of safe and affordable american-made vehicles creating thousands of jobs in enabling full use of the space station. no really this amounted to a new acquisition strategy, making payments based on milestones rather than size contracts, which is how wendy's commercial concept got a lot of attention in the price. where did you come up with this idea? how did it come forward and frankly it is genesis was long in the making and began in the carter administration would first embrace commercial and national space and when i think

they've created dfa office of commercial space and an year on space in the first bush administration when they sign the launch services purchase act. in 1998 when president clinton signed the commercial space act and contract its operations to private companies. as brett mentioned in 2004, the second bush administration and the commission also recommended using commercial enterprises are access for both crew and cargo to the worth or baked in may 2008, actually congress had weighed in and pushed nasa to develop a program for cargo and crew access to the international space station. so we built on that history of

harness the entrepreneurial energies to hopes are so nasa could focus on the high banks. so overall, our plan that we put together included more money for nasa, more jobs for the country, where investments in innovation. there were 3500 additional days in space over the next decade. more rocket launching news for an ambitious space program was on a nasa to really focus on the hard things it is best that. your technological developments in getting beyond low earth orbit in the technologies we need here. as this is this is seen as big change, lot of continuity with what folks have put together before appeared to be sure there have been critics as there has been at every major turning

point in space policy. within six months, we saw bipartisan legislation in the works. the administration saying it was an important and most of critical crowd and our space strategy for achieving the president school. and it really happen sooner than we ever thought possible. and it's really thanks to the leadership of senators nelson and hutchison and others for making nine happen. that history is still being written, but there's really some exciting stuff happening today because of the work that these gentlemen have done and what nasa is doing today. i think it's really an exciting process in space. in the coming months, nasa is pleased to announce more details on the heavy lift rocket will eventually take me in further and faster into space, the

places we haven't gone before and beyond the earthly cradle. just yesterday there's a $2 billion alpha magnetic spectrometer with the space station and scientists search for dark matter and antimatter, finally fulfilling the space station school is having a science component and turning it into research lab orbiting 250 miles above us. that was something that was 15 years in the making. and then taking us further into the solar system. that's not the messenger spacecraft within around mercouri. in a few weeks, another spacecraft is going to begin that stack on the second massive object in the asteroid realm. in august, juno will take us all the way to jupiter. this all come the largest mars rovers defense of a small car

will be lowered actually on a skytrain onto the surface of mars and nasa has another big program and will be several years off of all of us to see 10 times further than the hubble telescope. but the new commercial space race is really going gangbusters as we see more results faster than we'd expect to and it's an amazing progress. nasa just announced four new contracts for competitors ranging from boeing, really these are the basis of these are in tears for the commercial sector is stepping up to it in this case, there's four different capsule vehicles, some bodies, some all competing.

there's the south and would serve three years they are for potential capsules and their atlas five just made the biggest consecutive flight likely to be workforce in this area. launch for access to the space station is moving along like gangbusters, to. the new racket is likely to have its first launch this summer. they plan on getting cargo to the space station for their sickness other way to the space station. later this year will see if that works. space is likewise is about to match their cargo mission of which the space station. inside the orbital space, and other dynamic space for things that are happening. just last week virgin had

another breakthrough test. as early as next year we're going to see human spaceflight and the suborbital change. these are a big and dramatic things that are happening quickly and swiftly. it is a dynamic time, an exciting time to be in space. i am reminded of the is really only the beginning. i want to come back to this panel 20 years from now and see where we are. but this week marks the 50th anniversary of when jfk which the joint joint session of congress and said we want to go to dinner at lunch to a modern human spaceflight here. i think it's exciting were still reaching for new heights 50 years later, that were still a beginning of unlocking what space can bring and the boundless opportunities that lay ahead. i frankly still think the best

is yet ahead. without a ticket of peter marquez was instrumental within me up on the white house us draft our national space strategy. peter. [applause] delurk well, first thanks to david and just for putting this panel together. for me it has been great to feel too secure in the audience and listening to what is happening and how they got two really are. it's fascinating for me, so i appreciate the opportunity. one thing i want to talk about

the latest method of the content of policy or how it got there. at the white house are used to be a joke with my colleagues on the nsc, you know, we don't have a policy about this or that. there's nothing policy can air policy. why the heck these special nerds need a space policy. and the answer in my opinion is fairly clear. space isn't a place. it's a place, but a lot more than that. everywhere we go, everything we do come if you go to the atm, its face. check your e-mail, space. check the weather? space. if you turn in ireland or italy, tivoli space hope to get around. even just the most arcane uses of space. i went skiing a few months ago with my father-in-law and brother-in-law decided to let an app on my phone bill is able to track where he was, show i was on the ski trails. my speed, velocity, elevation

gain a month and then is able to dump it on google earth into a fight to see the different trails i have skied. sure the air force had no idea does have gps to be abused, but was sure fun to watch. in space at the way we do trade, were fair, completely modern warfare enabled by space and intelligence programs and science centers. spaces and everything we do. it is in spite of the space policy, ask them to put their funds or ask you to check the weather. that's why we need space both. i think she did a great job capturing the mass activities that have to do is focus on how we develop the obama space policy and other content in there besides some of the scientific mass activities. part of it was framed by inexperience in the latter years of the bush white house. there were few activities that occurred that really shaped my opinions on how we should do the next administration space posed the. one is i came in after china

aced the test. i would really call it a test. he something up on where they commuting right to something. he did something. that kind of changed the whole dynamic. here's another country willing to exhibit they were going to hold another nation's assets at risk assets we consider to be strategic, not just for nuclear deterrence, but activity we've conducted. it really was a shot that we got up in a peaceful environment at that point was nonthreatening environment. that framed part of it. the other part was that the bush policy have been put out in 06. i came in shortly after he was told to implement the policy. as we know we can trace the failures in policy because of feelers to implement the policy. when i got there, the basic great to have you here, new guy. the clock's running out. we've got other stuff to do. we're trying to get the

emergency together to say let's go do this. difficult is not impossible to do. not the fault of the guys who wrote the policy. it's just a matter of timing. part of that also shaped by a desire to get an obama policy out early. other things that are attached on is that the changing environment because these is utilized. the war on terror. space is a strategic contact tickle used at the same time in coalition warfare. we don't coalition of workforce and before world war i. but things are different. people on the ground were in different flags can be seen the same communications to accomplish missions. and then one thing that also shaped it and jim touchdown that was constellation program and where we need to go after that. constellation program is a concept looks great in its dimension epistemic ices looks great on paper, seems to be

doing well, but the way you find it is not excusable program. another one was stirfries. the u.s.a. 193 satellite engagement. that really was a defining moment for me. i've been on the job just a few months and you get a phone call this essay, the military must to shoot and a satellite. but that one to me -- everybody had mentioned the obama white house came in with an idea of openness and transparency. the seeds for openness and transparency was so out of the u.s.a. 193. what made the decision to take down the satellite and there is not a question of drama is going to be and share everything we were doing conjugation profiles everything we could tell that to show everybody in the world by redoing it and i keen eye of and the obama white house did a very faithful job in continuing on

the idea of opening and transparency. those are the things that in my mind she put her event on the national space policy. one of the things jeff and david asked us to talk about what changes are in the space policy previous administration. one was a chapeau. i'm not a flurry of national guy. they said start putting together a chapeau goes like i just want to rate policy. please send me do my job. instead they wanted poetry and it just blew my mind. but really in the end, it turned out to be a very helpful exercise. when that we all care about is what chance does that give the u.s. government, what tidings does forget to departments and agencies? policy is actually an external communications device. told other nations can other people at the u.s. intent is a golden policy are. i believe the chapeau national space policy set the tone in the

landscape and says this is by redoing space. this is why we do it yet this is what we believe in the rest of the policy says this is how executed. i thought the chapeau was a nice addition to the document. the principles and goals they think is all my colleagues and predecessors had mentioned, those that stayed pretty much the same since the eisenhower administration. but then those interested in the element to be up on administration policy is maybe was arrogance on my part. my friends will tell you i have it in spades, and those are just my friend, but i went and agreed the senior leadership considers the goals and principles could be said that i think that, but why? we've been doing it since eisenhower. a number of very senior person said i'll carry that eisenhower said it. they weren't being flip and, but it was more questionable are you doing these things? where the schools and principles? while the policies may have